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concurring in part and dissenting in
part). A consent that is "induced by
misrepresentation is not consent." 301
Md. at 350,483 A.2dat35 (Eldridge,J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The misrepresentation in Thomas
was that the defendant's counsel
believed that the psychiatrist that
evaluated the defendant was a neutral
expert from Clifton T. Perkins and not
the prosecution's paid expert.
The dissenter then dissected the
.majority's reasoning. He stated that the
burden of proof differences between
.Thomas and Estelle, as well as the
psychiatrist's warnings to the defendant
that any information which he revealed
could be used at a subsequent capital
sentencing hearing, were "utterly
irrelevant to the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel issue." 301 Md. at 352, 483
A.2d at 36 (Eldridge, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
Furthermore, Judge Eldridge argued that
although the defendant's counsel
consented to the psychiatrist's
examination, as in Estelle, his consent
was based on a misrepresentation by the
prosecution concerning the neutrality of
the psychiatrist. Therefore, citing Estelle
as controlling, the dissenter concluded
that "[b ]ecause of the prosecution's
misleading action in this case, the
defendant Thomas was deprived of the
assistance of counsel in deciding
whether or not to submit to ... [the
psychiatrist's] examination in
connection with the capital sentencing
hearing." 3D1 Md. at 352,483 A.2d at
36 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
The Thomas court appears to have
restricted the defendant's right to
assistance of counsel under the sixth
amendment. By allowing the post-trial
psychiatric examination of the
defendant for a determination on the
imposition of the death penalty without
the knowledgeable consent of the
defendant's counsel, it has gutted the
sixth amendment's protections
promulgated in Estelle. The court is
opening the door for the prosecution's
use of trickery and misrepresentation in
order to gain a defendant's counsel's
consent and to deny a defendant the
assistance of counsel guaranteed him
under the sixth amendment. Without
such assistance of counsel, poorly
educated and fearful defendants will be
wittingly or unwittingly denied the full
protection of the law by the
prosecution.
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DOCKWORKER'S REMEDY

Travelers Insurance Co., 370 U.S. 114,

he issue of whether a
dockworker's exclusive remedy
for an occupational injury is
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act ("Act" or
"LHWCA"), 33 U.S.c. §901 et seq.,
where a portion of the injury preceded
the Act's coverage, was subject to review
by the Maryland Court of Appeals
during its September, 1984 term. A
decision in Stanley v. Western Maryland
Railway Company, 301 Md. 204 482
A.2d881 (1984), was reached on October
24, 1984 and is one which will have
substantial impact in the area of
workers' compensation benefits. In
order to understand the ramifications of
Stanley, however, one must first have a
basic understanding of the principles
underlying the system of workers'
compensation.
Benefits for employees injured while
on the job were first a product of state
common law and statutes. Although the
fifty states vary greatly as to the
substantive legal principles which guide
particular workers' compensation
schemes, all systems share the same
underlying principles: to compensate an
employee as quickly and efficiently as
possible for work-related injuries,
regardless of an employee's
contributory negligence, and to limit the
ultimate liability of the employer for any
such injuries.
Prior to 1927, there was not a
uniform scheme of compensation law
applied by the states to Injuries
sustained by maritime workers.
Congress, therefore, saw the need for a
uniform federal system and the
LHWCA "was designed to ensure that a
compensation remedy existed for all
injuries sustained by employees on
navigable waters and to avoid
uncertainty as to the source, state or
federal, of that remedy." Calbeck v.

124 (1962).
Apparently, this federal system of
workers' compensation benefits for
,maritime employees provided sufficient
benefits to injured workers for a number
of years. However, a problem arose in
that a maritime employee was only
covered under the Act for certain
activities (usually only those performed
on navigable waters) and would not, in a
maj ori ty of cases, receive any
compensation benefits under LHWCA
for injuries sustained on land. Congress
amended the Act in 1972 "to extend
coverage to additional workers in an
attempt to avoid anomalies inherent in a
system that drew lines at the water's edge
by allowing compensation under the Act
only to workers injured on the seaward
side of a pier." Northeast Marine
Terminal Co., Inc. v. Caputo, 432 U.S.
249 (1977).
In the instant case, James Stanley had
been an employee of the Western
Maryland Railway Company since
1942. In approximately 1955 or 1956
Stanley was assigned to operate a crane
used to unload cargo from ships. The
crane was extremely noisy and caused a
gradual auditory impairment in
Stanley'S ears. He first became aware of
his permanent hearing loss in 1977 and,
in 1979, filed a negligence action against
his employer under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45
U.S.c. §51 et seq.
The Federal Employers' Liability Act,
enacted by Congress in 1908, permitted
a claimant to sue the railroad company,
his employer, for injuries resulting from
the company's negligence. Stanley
contended that the majority of his long
term exposure occurred prior to 1972,
at a time when he, as a dockworker, was
not covered by the LHWCA. Stanley,
therefore, sought to apportion his
hearing loss claim between the two
distinct Acts, FELA and LHWCA. In
apportioning his disability between the
two Acts, however, Stanley made a
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valiant attempt to sue his employer twice
for the same occupational injury, thus,
defeating the principle behind the
system of workers' compensation of
limiting an emplo]ers' liability.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of both the Court of Special
Appeals and the trial court and
adamantly refused to apportion the
claimant's injury between the two Acts.
In fact, in the area of workers'
compensation, the courts are generally
quite reluctant to apportion in such a
manner. See Newport News Shipbuilding
& Drydock Co. v. Fishel, 694 F.2d 327
(4th Cir. 1982) (single employer liable
for the claimant's hearing loss although
it was fully documented that the
claimant worked for numerous
employers). Apportionment between
state and federal systems is also not
permitted. See McCabe v. Sun
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the public policy considerations which
are an essential part of the workers'
compensation system. To allow this
type of apportionment would clearly
defeat the Congressional intent of
limiting an employer's liability for a
maritime worker's occupational injury.
Such apportionment between acts
would be in obvious conflict with the
LHWCA, 33 U.S.c. §905 (a) which
provides that "[ t ]he liability of an
employer prescribed in section 904 of
this title shall be exclusive and in place of
all other liablility of such employer to
the employee... ." Stanley, therefore,
manifests the intent of Congress
regarding the exclusiveness of liability
under the LHWCA and, presumably,
any possible apportionment between
Acts is an issue for the Congress and not
the courts to ultimately determine.
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Ben.Rev.Bd.Serv. (MB) 509 (1975),
rev'd. on other grounds, 593 F.2d 234 (3d
Cir. 1979). In Stanley, the court
determined that since the LHWCA
applied to a portion of the claimant's
injury, then the Act would provide
coverage for the entire injury.
The only case cited by Stanley as
providing authority for his position is

Verderane v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,
14 Ben.Rev.Bd.serv. (MB) 220.15,
BRB No. 76-244 (Aug. 13, 1981). At
issue in that case was whether the
claimant was a covered employee under
the Act during his long history of
employment, and the Benefits Review
Board ("Board") stated, "[W]e have
concluded that in determining
jurisdiction we must apply preamendment law to the period of
exposure prior to 1972 when the Act
became effective, and post-amendment
law thereafter;" 14 Ben.Rev.Bd. Servo
(MB) at 223. This statement, however,
was limited to the issue of determining
jurisdiction and was not applied by the
Board to determine the issue of
apportionment. Under this line of
reasoning, the Board found that
Verderane was covered under the preamendment Act, although not covered
after 1972. This fact, however, did not
deter the Board from holding that the
entire claim was compensable under the
LHWCA. "However, our conclusion
that claimant may have been exposed to
additional excessive noise during the
period when his employment was
outside the coverage of the Act does not
affect our determination that his vertigo
is compensable based on the earlier
exposure." Id. at 225.
The Stanley decision is in accord with
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IMPERFECT SELF DEFENSE
nState V. Faulkner, 301 Md.
482,483 A.2d 759 (1984), the
Court of Appeals of Maryland
recognized that imperfect self defense
can be used by a defendant as a defense
to mitigate a conviction entered against
him. To prevail upon such a defense, the
defendant must show the jury that his
actions were based on a subjectively
honest but objectively unreasonable
belief that he had to resort to deadly
force to prevent his own serious bodily
injury or death.
Faulkner had been involved in an
argument outside of a Baltimore City
bar. This argument escalated into a fist
fight and then into a non-fatal shooting.
Subsequently, Faulkner was charged
with assault with intent to murder and
related offenses. At his trial in the
Criminal Court of Baltimore, the court
instructed the jury as to the defenses of
justification. Faulkner's request for a
jury instruction on imperfect self
defense was refused by the judge. The
jury subsequently found Faulkner guilty
of assault with intent to murder. On
appeal, the court of special appeals, in a
split decision, agreed with Faulkner, and
held that he was entitled to the
instruction of imperfect self defense
because he had produced enough
evidence to generate a jury issue
regarding his belief at the time of the
shooting. The court of appeals agreed,
and went on to hold that the defense of
imperfect self defense applies to the
offense of assault with intent to murder.
The mitigating defense of imperfect
self defense operates to negate malice,
which is the mental state that the state
must prove to establish the crime of
murder. The court began its opinion by
noting that the difference between
murder and manslaughter is the absence
of malice. Self defense operates as a
complete defense to either murder or
manslaughter. A proper claim of self
defense will justify the homicide and
result in a judgment of acquittal. On the
other hand, imperfect self defense is not
a complete defense to a crime, but
rather, is merely a mitigating defense
which operates to negate malice, thereby
reducing murder to manslaughter.
Similar to imperfect self defense are
the heat of passion defenses of mutual
combat, assault and battery and
discovering a spouse in the act of sexual
intercourse with another, which can also
be used by a defendant to mitigate a
conviction entered against him. The key
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